Much recent research has documented that group attitudes and stereotypes may be activated spontaneously from memory, without the perceiver's intent, merely triggered by exposure to a relevant stimulus cue in the environment (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz 1998; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) . Such automatic activation occurs within a few hundred milliseconds after stimulus exposure and requires only very limited cognitive resources (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . It is generally assumed that the perceiver has only very limited control over the activation and often remains unaware of it and its potential influences on subsequent behaviors.
One reason why this work is of interest is because of its potential to provide new measures of prejudice and stereotyping, relatively freed from the normative constraints and social demand characteristics that contaminate traditional questionnaire measures. If one can assess prejudice at the automatic level, without respondents being aware of their responses, then these procedures offer promise as a "bona fide pipeline" to respondents "true" attitudes and beliefs (Fazio et al., 1995) .
Because of this potential, considerable debate has emerged concerning how measures of automatic stereotyping and prejudice relate to traditional explicit questionnaire measures. Whereas a number of studies indicate that indi-vidual differences in spontaneous prejudice are unrelated to differences on explicit measures (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997, Studies 1 and 3; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998) , other studies have found moderately strong relationships (Dovidio et al., 1997 , Study 2; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Kawakami et al., 1998; Wittenbrink et al., 1997) .
One obvious explanation for these discrepancies is the limited validity of explicit self-report measures, due to, most notably, their sensitivity to normative pressures as well as other context factors such as question order and wording. (e.g., Strack & Martin, 1987; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996) . Undoubtedly, explicit self-report measures have their limitations. In the present article, however, we focus on an alternative explanation for these discrepancies, namely on the possibility that the different automatic response measures used in the research to date have themselves measured somewhat different things. We focus in particular on two lines of work that have offered especially divergent conclusions: the evaluative priming procedure developed by Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio et al., 1995) and the concept priming procedure that we have used in our own research (Wittenbrink et al., 1997) .
The particular procedures used by both Fazio et al. (1995) and Wittenbrink et al. (1997) involve response time assessments in a sequential priming paradigm. Participants are presented with a priming stimulus (e.g., a group reference or exemplar), followed by a target stimulus that requires a response. The time it takes participants to respond to this stimulus serves as the primary dependent measure. These times are taken as indicative of the associative strength between prime and target stimuli in memory (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975) . In addition, the nature of the stimulus presentation insures that the observed priming effects are attributable to automatic activation of the target concept and not influenced by controlled strategies of the participant.
Although both lines of research share these general characteristics, the actual judgment task that participants perform differ substantially. Specifically, in our own work (Wittenbrink et al., 1997) , we have used a variation of Meyer and Schvaneveldt's (1971) lexical decision task in which group primes (BLACK and WHITE) are followed by target items that consist of words and nonwords (e.g., SMART and RAMST). The participants' task is to decide whether the target item represents an actual word, thus requiring concept identification. In contrast, the studies by Fazio and his colleagues (1995) ask participants to determine the evaluative implications of the target items (is this good or bad?). Having to determine a stimulus' identity on the one hand and its evaluative implications on the other hand are tasks which may activate somewhat different associations from long-term memory. Stimulus attributes that are relevant to one are not necessarily important for the other, and, thus, the memory contents primed under these different judgment contexts may differ in important ways. Indeed, prior work on the role of processing goals in knowledge activation suggests that different judgment goals in priming tasks are likely to yield different priming effects (see Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Macrae et al., 1997; Smith & Lerner, 1986) .
The primary purpose of the present research therefore is to clarify whether the seemingly inconsistent findings obtained by the two lines of research are in part explained by the differences in judgment task. Before presenting the results of a study that tested this hypothesis, we review the main differences in findings reported by the two lines of research.
The concept priming procedure used by Wittenbrink et al. involves presentation of primes that represent the relevant ethnic groups (e.g., BLACK and WHITE) or a neutral prime, followed by target letter strings for which participants have to decide whether the strings form a word. On the critical trials, four types of target words are used, positively and negatively valenced attributes that are either stereotypic of White Americans (e.g., educated and greedy) or stereotypic of African Americans (e.g., athletic and poor). The primes are presented outside of participants' conscious awareness to preclude controlled processes.
Wittenbrink et al. found that for White American participants the BLACK prime facilitated responses to negatively valenced attributes stereotypic of African Americans and the WHITE prime facilitated responses to positively valenced attributes stereotypic of White Americans. There was no evidence for more generalized facilitation, either to similarly valenced words that were not stereotypic of the primed group or to stereotypic words that were of the opposite valence (e.g., positively valenced words stereotypic of African Americans). Additionally, individual differences in this pattern of automatic "stereotypic prejudice" were relatively highly correlated with a number of explicit racial attitudes measures, gathered in a supposedly unrelated experimental session [e.g., the correlation with McConahay, Hardee, & Batts' (1981) Modern Racism Scale was .40; p Ͻ .001].
The experimental paradigm developed by Fazio and his colleagues differs from our procedure in several respects. Participants are presented, supposedly as part of a memory task, with photographs of either African American and White American targets which are followed by either positively or negatively valenced adjectives. As mentioned above, the participant's task is to determine the evaluative connotation of the target adjectives. Different from the concept priming procedure described above, priming stimuli are clearly visible. Exclusion of controlled processing is instead sought by means of a short stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between priming and target stimuli. Moreover, the target adjectives, while having clear evaluative connotations, are not chosen to be stereotypic of either target group (e.g., attractive or disgusting).
With White American participants, Fazio et al. found evidence for automatic prejudice, such that negative adjectives showed stronger facilitation when preceded by an outgroup prime than when preceded by an ingroup prime. Unlike the Wittenbrink et al. results, this facilitation did not depend on whether the adjectives were stereotypic of the target group since no stereotypic words were included. Thus these facilitation results suggest a more generalized pattern of prejudice, not dependent on the stereotypic match between the target adjective and the prime. Importantly, Fazio et al. reported that individual differences in this form of automatic prejudice were uncorrelated with MRS scores.
In an attempt to understand the differences between these two sets of results, we conducted a study that followed in large part the procedure used in our previous research (Wittenbrink et al., 1997) ; however, we manipulated the nature of the reaction time task. Half of the participants were asked to make conceptual judgments (word/nonword) of the target stimuli, whereas the remaining participants judged the stimuli for their evaluative connotation (good/ bad). Moreover, the reaction time task also included additional, nonstereotypic, but valenced, target items similar to those used by Fazio et al.
METHOD

Participants
The participants were 161 students recruited from the University of Chicago campus and paid $10 for their participation. Data from 11 participants who identified themselves as African American were excluded from the analyses.
Procedures
The study consisted of three ostensibly unrelated experiments, one on "judgmental accuracy," one on "word comprehension," and one involving a questionnaire. Upon arrival, participants received an introduction to all three experiments that emphasized their seemingly different nature.
In the first experiment, participants were asked to identify the ethnicity of individuals based on their first names. As in our previous research, the purpose of this task was to strengthen the association between the relevant ethnic groups and the lexical labels "BLACK" and "WHITE" that would subsequently serve as group primes. Participants judged 20 first names, half of which were stereotypically African American (e.g., Lamont) and half of which were stereotypically White American (e.g., Mark). Participants indicated whether each individual was likely to be Black or White.
Next, participants were told they would work on a "word comprehension" experiment. For this task, they would go through a large number of computer-based trials. On each trial they would first see a string of X's, followed by a letter sequence. This letter sequence would require their response which they should give as quickly and accurately as possible. Depending on the experimental condition to which they had been randomly assigned, they were given one of two judgment instructions. In the "Conceptual Judgment" condition, participants were given standard instructions for a lexical decision task, asking them to judge whether the target sequence constituted a word or a nonword. The response keys were labeled "YES" and "NO." In the "Evaluative Judgment" condition, participants received instructions following Fazio et al. Specifically, they were asked to indicate whether the target item made them think of something positive and good or negative and bad. Participants in this condition were instructed that some of the target letter sequences would actually not form correct English words. Nevertheless, they should respond according to their first inclination. Response keys in this condition were labeled "GOOD" and "BAD." Aside from these judgment instructions the reaction time procedure was identical in both conditions.
Once participants had completed the reaction time task, they were handed a questionnaire containing six different explicit measures of racial prejudice. Specifically, the questionnaire included a measure commonly used to assess feelings toward social groups, the "feeling thermometer" rating scale, as well as a set of five belief-based prejudice measures: the Modern Racism Scale by McConahay et al. (1981) , the Pro-Black and Anti-Black scales of Katz and Hass (1988) , the Diversity and the Discrimination Scales (both Wittenbrink et al., 1997) .
Reaction Time Task Stimuli
Presentation of experimental stimuli and data collection was controlled by the PSYSCOPE software package (Version 1.2.2, Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) on Apple PowerMacintosh 7200/120 computers equipped with PSYSCOPE button boxes and 14-in. monitors. The monitors were set to a resolution of 860 ϫ 640 pixels. All stimuli were presented in 18 point Times Macintosh font.
Each trial of the reaction time task, started with a fixation point ("ϩ") in the center of the computer screen. The fixation point appeared for 1000 ms and was immediately followed by the prime. After 15 ms, the prime was replaced by a masking stimulus ("XXXXX"), which remained on the screen for 250 ms. Following the masking stimulus, the target letter sequence appeared for another 250 ms. The computer then paused until the participant had responded.
Thus, the stimulus presentation followed the procedure used in Wittenbrink et al. However, we used a different set of target items, including not only items stereotypic of the two target groups, White and African Americans, but also valenced nonstereotypic adjectives (e.g., appealing).
1 These were chosen to be similar to the Fazio et al. stimulus materials, but to not include adjectives that could potentially be seen as stereotypic. Table 1 presents the full set of target adjectives. Given the nature of the judgment task in the conceptual judgment condition (i.e., word/nonword), target items also included 16 nonword fillers.
In total, the set of trials fully crossed three independent factors, prime ("BLACK," "WHITE," and neutral), target item (stereotypic of African American, stereotypic of White American, nonstereotypic, and nonword), and valence (positive, and negative), 2 resulting in a total of 192 experimental trials, which were individually randomized for each participant. Additionally, 10 practice trials were presented at the start of the reaction time task.
Stimulus Timing
In the Wittenbrink et al. study, pretesting showed that participants were not aware of the primes given their 15-ms presentation. We conducted a similar pretest, recruiting an additional 10 participants. They first took part in the name identification "experiment," just as participants did in the main study. They then completed a random subset of 48 trials from the main reaction time procedure identical to those used in the experiment proper, except that we told participants that words would briefly appear on the screen prior to the stimulus mask and that they should attempt to identify them. Despite these instructions, pretest participants could not identify the primes correctly on any of the 480 trials.
RESULTS
We first present the results for each of the two judgment conditions separately, reporting both analyses of mean reaction times as well as correlations with the explicit attitudes measures. Next, we then present a comparison of results between conditions.
To examine response facilitation, we examined two focused contrasts of theoretical interest (following Wittenbrink et al., defined in Table 2 ). The first contrast (I) captures what we have previously called stereotypic prejudice: facilitation in response to valenced stereotypic items. More specifically, this contrast examines whether negatively valenced items stereotypic of African Americans are facilitated by the "BLACK" prime and positively valenced items stereotypic of White Americans are facilitated by the "WHITE" prime.
The second contrast (II) captures what we have called generalized prejudice, that negatively valenced items, regardless of their stereotypicality, are more facilitated by the "BLACK" prime than are positively valenced items and the reverse is true for the "WHITE" prime. We have argued that the facilitation results of Fazio et al. are of this more generalized form, since they did not reflect facilitation on stereotypic items. Accordingly, a variant on this generalized prejudice contrast (IIA) examines whether facilitation is consistent with generalized prejudice when omitting the stereotypic items.
Prior to the analyses, we examined the distributions for the response latency data. As is common for this kind of measure (Ratcliff, 1993) , the data showed positive skew and included small numbers of outliers. To deal with these problems, response latencies faster than 150 ms and slower than 2 standard deviations above the individual's mean response time were deleted. This resulted in an exclusion rate of 3%, similar to that applied by other researchers. Additionally, analyses of the latency data were conducted following an inverse transformation. For ease of interpretation, however, we report mean values in milliseconds.
Conceptual Judgment Condition
Response facilitation. To examine response facilitation due to the two group primes, the response latency for each target item following each of the group primes was subtracted from the latency for that same target item following the neutral prime. Accordingly, more positive values indicate greater response facilitation due to a group prime. These facilitation scores were analyzed as a function of 1 Items stereotypic of the two target groups were based on Judd et al. (1995) . 2 The nonword target items did not vary systematically in valence. Instead the design included an equal number of nonword target items for the two cells (positive/negative). These items, of course, only served as fillers to make the word/nonword judgment task meaningful and were not included in the analyses. Table 3 . Considering first the conditions that were included in our previous research, that is, looking only at items that are stereotypic of one group or the other-omitting the nonstereotypic items, the pattern of results obtained for this judgment task replicates our previous results. The data show that stereotypic prime/target combinations (BLACK/AA items and WHITE/WA items) yield overall stronger facilitation than do counterstereotypic combinations [M's ϭ 9.37 vs 0.49; F(1,76) ϭ 5.49; p ϭ .022). The means make clear, however, that this overall stereotyping effect is attributable solely to the facilitation observed in two cells of the design: BLACK primes/negative AA items and WHITE primes/ positive WA items. In other words, as in Wittenbrink et al., the stereotyping effect was again qualified by an outgroup valence bias. BLACK primes facilitated especially those African American target items that were negative (M ϭ 19.70) rather than those that were positive (M ϭ 1.59). In contrast, WHITE primes increased response speed for positive stereotypic items (M ϭ 17.43), while barely affecting responses to negative stereotypic items (M ϭ Ϫ1.21). The corresponding stereotypic prejudice contrast (Contrast I) is significant, again replicating our previous results [F(1,76) ϭ 6.79; p ϭ .011].
The cell means suggest that a more generalized form of prejudice, involving facilitation for nonstereotypic items, is not found with this conceptual judgment task. And indeed, a test of the generalized prejudice contrast (II) shows it to be nonsignificant [F(1,76) ϭ 1.98; p ϭ .168]. Leaving out the stereotypic items, and only testing for generalized prejudice on the non-stereotypic and counterstereotypic items, confirms the absence of this effect (Contrast IIA: F Ͻ 1).
In addition to tests of these theoretically motivated contrasts, we were also interested in whether facilitation in an absolute sense occurred. Accordingly, we tested whether cell means differed significantly from zero. Again replicating our earlier results, only two means were significant: when negatively valenced African American stereotypic items followed the BLACK prime and when positively valenced White American stereotypic items followed the WHITE prime (indicated with asterisks in Table 3 ).
In sum, replicating our earlier results, we find evidence for stereotypic prejudice but no generalization of these priming effects to nonstereotypic or counterstereotypic items.
Relationships with explicit measures. Separate scores on each of the five explicit belief-based measures were computed. Additionally, a score on the thermometer measure was computed by subtracting the rating given to Blacks from that given to Whites. Table 4 presents the intercorrelations among all six explicit measures (higher scores on all indicate more explicit prejudice). All five belief-based attitude scales are intercorrelated substantially and in the expected direction. The thermometer measure is also reliably, although more weakly, correlated with the other explicit measures.
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To examine the relationships between these explicit prejudice scores and the patterns of facilitation from the response time procedure, we computed contrast scores for each individual on the two primary contrasts: stereotypic prejudice and generalized prejudice. Higher scores on these contrasts indicate that an individual participant is showing greater automatic prejudice. These scores were correlated with the six explicit prejudice measures, with the results presented in the left portion of Table 5 . These correlations replicate what we found earlier. The stereotype specific contrast of automatic prejudice consistently correlates more highly with these explicit measures than does the generalized contrast. Indeed, there are significant correlations between the stereotypic prejudice contrast and the MRS, Diversity, and Discrimination scales. Only the Discrimination scale correlates significantly with generalized prejudice. The thermometer measure fails to correlate significantly with either contrast.
Evaluative Judgment Condition
Response facilitation. Table 6 presents the mean facilitation scores for participants in the evaluative judgment condition. A quick inspection of these scores reveals that patterns of facilitation seem quite different in this condition. Whereas before significant facilitation was found only for negatively valenced African American items following the BLACK prime and positively valenced White American items following the WHITE prime, in this condition significant facilitation (indicated by the asterisks in Table 6 ) is found for all negatively valenced items, regardless of stereotypicality, following the BLACK prime, and all positively valenced items, regardless of stereotypicality, following the WHITE prime, suggesting the more generalized form of automatic prejudice. Tests of both stereotypic prejudice and generalized prejudice contrasts are significant in this condition [Contrast I: F(1, 72) ϭ 9.05; p ϭ .004; Contrast II: F(1, 72) ϭ 20.24; p Ͻ .0001]. In sharp contrast, however, to the results from the conceptual task condition, strong evidence for generalized prejudice is found here when excluding the stereotypic items [contrast IIA: F(1, 72) ϭ 11.75; p ϭ .001]. And in fact, when only nonstereotypic items are included (thus only using items like those used by Fazio et al.), we find significant generalized prejudice [F(1,72) ϭ 4.49; p ϭ .039], replicating the results from Fazio et al.
Relationship with explicit measures. Correlation coefficients for the within-subject contrasts from this judgment condition and the explicit prejudice measures are listed on the right side of Table 5 . Whereas in the conceptual judgment condition, we found systematic and reliable relationships between the explicit prejudice measures and participants' tendency to display automatic stereotypic prejudice, the valence judgment condition yields very different results. First, with regard to the belief-based measures, correlations with the two prejudice contrasts are generally positive but relatively weak and nonsignificant. However, the Thermometer measure of attitudes is significantly correlated with the generalized prejudice contrast. This measure, unlike the attitude scales which ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement with certain group-related beliefs, may be tapping a more affective or feeling-based form of explicit prejudice. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that it now correlates with generalized prejudice when the task is an evaluative one, whereas it was the belief-based measures that correlated with stereotypic prejudice from the conceptual task. Each task seems to manifest a characteristic form of automatic prejudice and these different forms then show correlations with explicit measures that seem to tap similar explicit components.
Comparison of the Judgment Conditions
We next looked at potential differences in the overall level of facilitation between the two conditions. As we already mentioned, the evaluative judgment condition resulted in broader priming effects, with 6 instead of 2 of the 12 cells of the design yielding significant facilitation. However, the overall facilitation means do not differ by condition [conceptual: M ϭ 1.43; evaluative: M ϭ 6.92; F(1,149) ϭ 1.96; p ϭ .164].
To compare the influences of priming and target item factors in the two conditions, we conducted analyses with task as a between-participants factor. Of the effects involving the task factor, the only significant one was the interaction between task and the generalized prejudice contrast excluding the stereotypic items (IIA) [F(1,149) ϭ 5.58; p ϭ .019]. This interaction captures what we have already described as the primary difference in the facilitation patterns from the two judgment conditions: automatic prejudice is found only for stereotypic items for the conceptual judgment condition, whereas it generalizes to nonstereotypic items in the other condition.
DISCUSSION
Our goal was to determine whether some of the apparently conflicting results in past research on automatic prejudice may be due to differences in the sorts of tasks that have been used. More specifically, it seemed to us that a conceptual task, such as the lexical task that we have used previously, and an evaluative task, like that developed by Fazio et al., may tap into different memory contents, with consequences for the pattern of correlations manifested with explicit prejudice measures.
The results we obtained nicely replicated our own earlier results, in the conceptual task condition, and those of Fazio et al., in the evaluative task condition. Specifically, we found that the conceptual task resulted in a response pattern that we have called stereotypic prejudice, with group primes facilitating responses to valenced items only if they are stereotypic of the primed group (negatively valenced items for the out-group; positively valenced ones for the ingroup). Additionally, individual differences in the strength of this automatic response pattern were reliably correlated with scores on explicit racial attitude scales that tap beliefs about racial inequities in our society. When the task was an evaluative one, however, a more generalized form of auto- matic prejudice was observed, with the out-group prime facilitating responses to negatively valenced items regardless of whether they were stereotypic of the primed group and in-group primes facilitating responses to positively valenced items regardless of their stereotypicality. Individual differences in this pattern of automatic prejudice were not correlated significantly with the belief-based explicit measures of racial attitudes, although there was a significant correlation with a more affective-based explicit measure, i.e., the feeling thermometer ratings.
Implications for the Assessment of Group Attitudes and Stereotyping
An immediate implication of the present results concerns the assessment of attitudes. As mentioned above, one particular reason why automatic attitudes have received such attention in the past several years is that they seem to promise bona fide measures of people's true attitudes. As much as we share the hope for veridical measures of social constructs, we do believe that the search for the single, unbiased measure of a person's "true" sentiments ought to be elusive and that such automatic measures will result at best in a true assessment of only some aspect or component of the underlying attitude.
The present results then provide further support for the notion that attitudes are not necessarily based on a single, homogenous, representation in memory, but instead are based on multiple, potentially diverse and discrepant, memory contents. Therefore, different measures may reveal different "attitudes," depending on what aspects of the underlying representation the measures make salient. With regard to explicitly measured attitudes and beliefs, such effects of assessment context are widely recognized (Schwarz & Strack, 1991; Tesser, 1978; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Wilson & Hodges, 1992; Zanna & Rempel, 1988) . The present results suggest that these effects are not limited to explicit measures and that therefore-even at the level of automatic activation-there is not just one single measure of a person's attitude toward a given attitude object.
With regard to the particular contents that the two judgment conditions tap in the present experiment, the threecomponent view of attitudes offers one possible explanation. That is, there is widespread support for the assumption that attitudes include an affective basis, as well as cognitive components and behavioral predispositions, and that these three components need not always be entirely consistent (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) . Explicit measures clearly vary in which of these components they most strongly tap. Likewise, it seems perfectly reasonable in light of this component view of attitudes that our more conceptual task seems to tap more directly the cognitive or belief-based component of the attitude, while the evaluative task used by Fazio et al. is more closely picking up the more affective aspects of the automatic attitude. Our results are certainly consistent with more general propositions concerning the relative independence of affective and cognitive systems (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; LeDoux, 1996; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 1980) , although the present study was certainly not designed to explicitly tests these propositions. More pragmatically, the present data suggest that future research can benefit from a careful differentiation of these aspects of prejudice.
Automaticity in Social Cognitive Functioning
Beyond their immediate relevance for intergroup attitudes and stereotypes, we believe the present results have broader implications for social psychology's conceptualization of automaticity. Automatic responses have commonly been considered obligatory responses that are inevitably triggered when a certain stimulus is encountered in the environment. The present results are at odds with such a view. In the present experiment, activation of group stereotypes and attitudes was "automatic" in the sense that it occurred involuntarily, in response to stimuli of which participants were unaware, and in the sense that it was observed within a time frame too short to be affected by participants' active control. Nevertheless, these automatic responses were not invariant and were not obligatory, reflexive reactions to a certain stimulus. Rather, identical priming stimuli led to quite different automatic responses in the two judgment conditions.
Our present argument that automatic responses are indeed malleable rather than fixed, reflexive stimulus responses is to some extent consistent with Bargh's (1994) notion of "conditional automaticity." With this concept, Bargh contrasts automatic cognitive processes that are triggered invariantly, whenever the presence of the triggering stimulus in the environment is registered, from those automatic processes that occur only if certain preconditions are met. Such preconditions, according to Bargh, may include recent relevant controlled thought processes ("postconscious automaticity") or prior activation of relevant goal states ("goaldependent automaticity"). In particular, then the present findings are consistent with the notion of goal-dependent automaticity. In this study, participants' automatic activation of group stereotypes and attitudes depended on their objective when performing the judgment task. Trying to determine the evaluative implications of stimuli appearing on the computer screen led to different spontaneous responses than trying to determine their identity.
CONCLUSION
Social scientific research of the past 40 years has documented that racial attitudes among White Americans are complex and multidetermined. If we are to understand the responses of White Americans to racial minorities in U.S. society, then it is clear that we need to understand racial beliefs and values in all their complexity. Knowing the associations that are stored in long-term memory and being able to assess these in an "unfiltered" and "pure" manner is undoubtedly useful in this endeavor. But just as explicit measures of racial attitudes may tap different aspects and components of those attitudes, so too may different automatic assessment procedures.
